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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to warrant the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis even though the defect
appears on the face of the record and an appeal would have raised the question of the deprivation of his rights." However, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the court is bound to presume that the
lower court performed its duty.6 5 In reviewing a case such as this the court
is bound by the findings of the lower court, but may view the entire record
and evaluate, as a matter of law, the situation existing at the time of the
alleged deprivation. 66 In People v. Marincic67 the court held, granting a writ
of coram nobis, that the mere advising of the defendant of his right to counsel
was not sufficient where the defendant did not fully understand his rights and
thus did not have a fair opportunity to exercise them within the meaning of
Section 699 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.
In viewing the record as a whole the majority and minority differed as to
whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant fully understood his
rights.
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OF JUDGE To ANSWER JURY'S REQUEST FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS

Section 427 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
after the jury have retired for deliberation, "if they desire to be informed of
a point of law arising in the cause, . . . the information required must be
given ... " The mandate of this statute "leaves to the trial court no discretion
whatever as to whether or not to answer a proper question from the jury, even
though the original charge contains a correct answer to that same question."6 3
It is settled law that a judge may not decline to answer a jury's request for
further instructions.6 9 However, a failure by the court to categorically answer
any question propounded by a jury need not be reversible error. In each case
the reviewing court must decide whether there was serious prejudice to the
defendant's rights. 70 Naturally, where the failure to answer involves a vital
point, it may not be disregarded as harmless.
In the case of People v. Miller71 the trial court failed to answer questions
of law as to possible verdicts to be arrived at. The court, instead, offered to
reread "the entire charge on the crime" if the jury wanted it. Although the
foreman replied: "I don't think it is necessary," the Court of Appeals, in a 5-1
decision, said that the failure to answer the question constituted reversible
error and a new trial was ordered for the defendant, who had been found guilty
of felony murder. The high court, relying heavily on the lucid decision by
Judge Desmond in People v. Gonzalez,72 said that since the confusion of the
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jury centered on the charges as to felony murder, and that defendant's life
depended upon the jury's proper understanding of the elements of the crime,"3
"a mere offer to reread the principal charge-although it was correct-would
be of little help to a perplexed jury ... This is so, even though the foreman
later stated that it was not necessary to repeat the charge."
Thus we see, once again, that when a deliberating jury requests information pertaining to a vital point, a response that fails to provide a proper
answer is reversible error-and a trial court's offer to reread the entire charge
is not a proper answer.
SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENT FOR RECKLESS DRIvING
It is well settled that an indictment must apprise a defendant of every
material element of the crime charged.7 4 An indispensable element of the crime
of reckless driving is that the defendant's driving had unreasonably interfered
with the use of the highway.7 5 In People v. Armlin7 6 defendant was charged
with reckless driving under an indictment which did not allege that he unreasonably interfered with the use of the highway, but which did allege that
he drove his vehicle across the center line of the highway into the path of an
approaching vehicle without any warning and at a high rate of speed, in
violation of the statute forbidding reckless driving.
The defendant contended that the indictment failed to charge him with
unreasonable interference with the use of the highway.
Reinstating the conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the indictment
need not in terms charge that defendant acted unreasonably if it describes an
act which constitutes unreasonable interference.7 7 It is only when the indictment neither charges unreasonableness nor describes an act which is unreasonable that a defendant can complain that he has not been informed of that
78
element of the crime.
Since the purpose of the rule is to enable a defendant to prepare his
defense, a defendant can hardly claim surprise when all the elements of the
crime charged are descriptively detailed in the indictment, and the statute
availed of by the State is made known to him.
POSSESSION OF MATERIALS USED IN THE POLICY GAmu
Section 974 of the New York Penal Law forbids knowingly possessing any
article of any kind commonly used in promoting the policy game.7 9 In People
73. People v. Flynn, 290 N.Y. 220, 48 N.E.2d 495 (1943).
74. People v. Allen, 5 Denio (N.Y.) 76 (1847); Dedieu v. People, 22 N.Y. 178 (1860);
People v. Santoro, 229 N.Y. 277, 128 N.E. 234 (1920). Cf. dicta in People v. Miller, 143
App. Div. 251, 128 N.Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dep't 1911); People v. Colburn, 162 App. Div.
651, 147 N.Y. Supp. 689 (2d Dep't 1911).
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